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MIDWAY AND THE INDIAN OCEAN
Jeremy Black
While we are at war with Germany and Italy we do not possess the na-
val resources necessary to maintain the command of the Indian Ocean
against any heavy detachment from the main Japanese fleet.
WINSTON CHURCHILL
Winston Churchill’s remark to the Secret Session of the House of Com-mons on 23 April 1942 provides the key to this article, an attempt to fo-
cus on the strategic significance of Midway.1
American victory at Midway may well be a self-evident proposition to Ameri-
cans and others contemplating the course and significance of the struggle be-
tween America and Japan between 1941 and 1945 for dominance of the Pacific.
Yet that struggle does not exhaust the importance of that battle, and it particu-
larly behooves a non-American to comment on the wider significance of Mid-
way. Such a task could be profitably repeated for other battles seen as turning
points, notably Stalingrad, El Alamein, the Atlantic convoy battles of the spring
of 1943, and Kohima (in northeastern India in April 1944, where British and In-
dian forces repulsed the Japanese). Each is too readily
approached in terms of the particular combatants
who fought the battle, with a tendency to underplay
its wider significance.
As far as Midway is concerned, my general perspec-
tive is the issue of the prospects for, and success of, co-
alition warfare during the Second World War, and my
specific concern is serious British weakness in the In-
dian Ocean region. Coalition warfare faces problems
and creates irritations, but it can also be a crucial force
multiplier. In the Second World War, the Allies con-
fronted multiple issues, both political and military, in
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pursuing coalition warfare. A coalition that included Joseph Stalin, Chiang
Kai-shek, and Charles de Gaulle was scarcely going to be easy, and alongside the
inherited distrusts and special interests that they represented, there were also se-
rious problems in Anglo-American relations, both political and military. In-
deed, there is a rich literature on the subject.2
In contrast, there is no such extensive literature on the deficiencies of Axis co-
alition warfare, and this is appropriate, because despite the extent to which the
totalitarian regimes of the Axis had more in common than the Allies, they failed
as an effective alliance.3 In particular, the two leading Axis powers, Germany and
Japan, were unable to create a military partnership, nor to provide mutual eco-
nomic assistance that in any way matched that of the Allies, strained as relations
among the latter were. German and Italian submarines were to link up in the In-
dian Ocean with the Japanese, but they did not mount any large-scale concerted
operations.4 German plans for war with the United States made little of the pros-
pect of Japanese assistance and preferred to focus on the possibility of using na-
val power and, subsequently, when that ceased to be even remotely plausible, on
the prospect of “wonder weapons.”5
Germany and Japan indeed fought what were in essence two separate wars,
and there was little in the way of coordination or cooperation between them,
and still less between Italy and Japan. In Eritrea, Italy had a colony on the Red
Sea, with a port at Massawa, where destroyers were based, and, in Somalia, an-
other on the Indian Ocean, with a port at Mogadishu; both, however, were con-
quered by the British before there was any prospect of cooperation. Mogadishu
was captured by a force from Kenya on 25 February 1941, Massawa following on
8 April, falling to a force from Sudan, while Berbera in British Somaliland, which
the Italians had conquered in August 1940, was recaptured on 16 March 1941 by
a force from Aden, in an amphibious operation.
The Italian navy was large and modern and included six battleships, nineteen
cruisers, and 113 submarines, although no aircraft carriers. This fleet, however,
was largely confined to the Mediterranean, although Italian submarines took
part in the Battle of the Atlantic from 1941. With the British in control of Egypt,
the Italians were in no shape to intervene in the Indian Ocean, irrespective of the
problems posed by a lack of fuel, air cover, or determined leadership.
The high point of German-Japanese coordination was Germany’s decision to
declare war on the United States after Pearl Harbor, an attack Hitler had sought
to encourage by pressing forward military operations against Moscow. This dec-
laration of war, however, was essentially the product of the deterioration in
American-German relations, rather than a means to assist Japan;6 the declara-
tion of war did not lead to any concerted attempt at grand strategy.
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The only sphere in which such an attempt might have been possible was the
Indian Ocean, with German pressure on the Middle East interacting with Japa-
nese advances on India and in the Indian Ocean. British policy makers, indeed,
feared joint pressure in the form, for example, of a possible German advance
through Turkey, prior to the launching of Operation BARBAROSSA, or, subse-
quently, through the Caucasus.
These concerns were a second tranche of earlier fears about the Germans ex-
ploiting support in Iraq and (Vichy) Syria, as they had sought to do. This had led
to the British invasion of both in the summer of 1941.
The fears of an advance through Turkey did not materialize. The Germans
did not invade, and had they done so, they would have found the Turkish army
capable of mounting a formidable resistance. Moreover, any advance through
Turkey would have encountered serious logistical and transport limitations and
problems. Pressuring Turkey into granting transit rights would have been a dif-
ficult question, but the situation would have had to be more dire for such pres-
sure to succeed.
In the event, the planned German advance to the Azerbaijani oil fields near
Baku in late 1942 was thwarted by Soviet resistance and by Hitler’s focus on the
capture of Stalingrad. By then, anyway, the British and Soviets had occupied Iran
(from 25 August), capturing Tehran on 17 September. Persia provided a crucial
route for Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union, as well as giving British India
considerable defense in depth in the event of German success in the Caucasus or
the Middle East.
In practice, the German threat to the Indian Ocean came most directly via
Egypt. The Germans had driven back the British in Libya in 1941, and, having
been forced to fall back in November 1941, returned to the offensive in early
1942. On 20 June 1942, following the German success in the battle of Gazala,
the key Libyan port of Tobruk, a forward defense for Egypt, fell, and the Afrika
Corps then advanced into Egypt. In July and September, however, Erwin
Rommel tried and failed to break through the British defenses in order to ad-
vance on Alexandria and the Suez Canal. The German advance created consid-
erable pressure and led to an atmosphere of crisis, as well as to the departure of
the Mediterranean fleet from Alexandria. Yet the attacks were held, while the
pro-British ministry in Egypt kept the significant Axis elements that existed
there at bay.
As a consequence, the Axis threat to the Indian Ocean region came from Ja-
pan. This region was crucial to a number of strands in the Allied war effort. Via
the Indian Ocean came Allied aid to both China and the Soviet Union, as well as
oil from the Middle East. The Indian Ocean was also central to the defense of
Egypt and the Middle East, as well as to the articulation of the British imperial
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system, notably the deployment of Indian, Australasian, and South African
forces. Indeed, in his Rulers of the Indian Ocean (1927), Admiral George A.
Ballard noted:
As regards its present form or fabric the Empire may be roughly divided into an occi-
dental half—including the British Isles—and an oriental; which are held together
commercially and strategically by the Imperial lines of communication across the In-
dian Ocean; the whole being kept in contact with foreign lands throughout the East
by the trade routes traversing the same water–space. If those connections are cut, the
two halves of the Empire will fall apart as surely as night follows day.7
Born in India, Ballard (1862–1948) was a product of empire, who had served in
Sudanese (1884), Burmese (1885–86), and Chinese (1900) waters, as well as be-
ing director of the Operations Division of the Admiralty War Staff.
The vulnerability of the British Empire to Japanese attack had been a major
theme in prewar planning and had led, in particular, to the scheme for the devel-
opment of a major naval base in Singapore. As early as 1919 an Admiralty mem-
orandum had warned that the Royal Navy was likely to be weaker than that of
Japan in the Far East. It suggested that using Hong Kong as a base would expose
the fleet and that instead Singapore should be developed, as it was sufficiently far
from Japan to permit reinforcement without peril.8
By the 1930s, the British planned to send a major fleet to Singapore in the
event of war with Japan.9 In 1940, however, the naval situation deteriorated
sharply. Germany’s victory over France took the latter’s navy out of the Allied
camp, greatly increasing British vulnerability. This issue was greatly exacer-
bated by Italy’s entry into the war in June 1940, which exposed Britain’s posi-
tion in the Mediterranean. The establishment of forward submarine bases in
the German conquests of Norway and France made Britain’s Atlantic supply
routes far more exposed than in the First World War. In 1941, the Royal Navy
took heavy losses in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. In such circum-
stances, it was unsurprising that the First Sea Lord complained in September
1941 of a shortage of cruisers, adding that “the destroyer situation is even
worse,” when explaining why he could send none to the Far East.10
Concerned about the war with Germany, the British mistakenly hoped that
the defense of Malaya and Singapore would benefit from the strength of the
American fleet in the western Pacific, and they also seriously mishandled their
own naval units in the face of Japanese airpower. A powerful squadron, though
without any carriers (due to the damage suffered by the intended one), was sent
from Singapore to contest the Japanese landings in Malaya, but on 10 December
Japanese land-based naval bombers sank the key units, the battleship Prince of
Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse. These were the first ships of these types
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sunk in open sea solely by air attack, and their loss demonstrated the vulnerabil-
ity of capital ships without air cover against air attack. The poorly conceived and
executed plan of the force commander, Sir Tom Phillips, also reflected wider is-
sues, including deficiencies in air-sea coordination.11
Two months later, in the battle of the Java Sea (27 February–1 March), Allied
naval forces unsuccessfully attacked a Japanese fleet en route to Java. The Japa-
nese fleet was well coordinated, enjoyed superior air support, and benefited
from better torpedoes; for their part, the American, Australian, British, and
Dutch warships lacked an able commander and experience of fighting together.
The Allied fleet was destroyed.
By then, Singapore had fallen to Japan (on 15 February), followed on 8 March
by Rangoon in Burma. With their conquest of Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, and
Burma, the Japanese were best placed to advance into the Indian Ocean region,
where indeed they occupied the Andaman and Nicobar islands in March, which
had been evacuated by the British.
In April, the Japanese under Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, with five carriers
and three hundred planes, launched an expedition into the Indian Ocean. The
main Japanese strike force advanced to the south of Ceylon, raiding the port of
Colombo, sinking a destroyer, and downing twenty-seven British aircraft for
nine of their own. On the 5th, at 1:55 in the afternoon, the Japanese also sank
two British heavy cruisers, Devonshire and Cornwall, to the southwest of Ceylon.
Nagumo followed on 9 April by an advance to the east of Ceylon, from which a
raid was launched against the key naval base of Trincomalee. Caught at sea, the
small carrier Hermes and the Australian destroyer Vampire were sunk at nine
o’clock that morning. (Commissioned in 1924, Hermes had a tonnage of only
9,765 and an overall length of 181.8 meters, not quite six hundred feet, and car-
ried only twenty-five aircraft.) The Japanese then withdrew.
A separate squadron—Malaya Force, under Vice Admiral Jisaburo
Ozawa—sailed from Mergui, in southern Burma, steaming west between the
Andaman Islands and the Nicobars. On 6 April, from off the coast of eastern In-
dia, Ozawa launched raids on the ports of Cocanada and Vizagapatan and at-
tacked shipping in the Bay of Bengal, sinking twenty-three merchant ships,
twenty in one day. (Ozawa had been in operational control when the British
warships were sunk on 10 December 1941 and was to go on to command the
First Mobile Fleet during the battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944.) In addition, in
April 1942, off India’s west coast, Japanese submarines sank thirty-two thousand
tons of shipping.
The British Eastern Fleet, under Admiral Somerville, was a considerable
force, with three carriers (two of them new), five old battleships, and five cruis-
ers, but the Japanese attack had come when it was off its cruising area south of
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Ceylon, to refuel and rewater at Addu Atoll in the distant southern Maldives.
The warships sunk by the Japanese had been sent to Ceylon for repair and escort
duties, and their loss made Somerville uneasily aware of his weakness. He cor-
rectly thought that his carrier aircraft were unable to compete with the more nu-
merous and better Japanese aircraft and that this deficiency left the battleships
vulnerable. As a result, Somerville sent the battleships to Mombasa, in Kenya.
Had the Japanese been able to establish a permanent naval presence in the In-
dian Ocean, they would have threatened not only the British position in India
but also that in the Middle East, challenging Britain’s oil supplies from the Per-
sian Gulf and its routes to Australia. The buildup of Ceylon’s garrison to a
strength of two divisions by the close of March 1942 was a response. As there was
to be no Japanese landing, this force was not tested, and it is easy for historians,
when space is at a premium, to ignore such moves. However, they throw light on
strategic preferences. The troops deployed in Ceylon could not be sent to protect
India against an advance from Burma, as Field Marshal Wavell, the commander
in chief in India, wished; also, the decision reflected the determination of the
Chiefs of Staff to maintain oceanic links. Had the Japanese landed an invasion
force on Ceylon, it is difficult to see why they should not have repeated earlier
successes: British fighting quality was no stronger, although the civilian popula-
tion was resolved to resist the Japanese. In his war diary, Admiral Sir Geoffrey
Layton, Commander in Chief Ceylon, noted, “Ceylon, on my arrival there on
21st January [1942], was virtually defenceless. . . . [T]he problem of retaining
control of the coastal waters of Burma was quite beyond our powers in the ab-
sence of either air superiority or fast patrol craft with good AA [antiaircraft] ar-
mament so numerous that we could afford substantial losses.”12
The Japanese advance forced Somerville to think about the need to protect
the Arabian Sea, and thus tanker sailings from the Persian Gulf, as well as the
routes from both the Gulf and the Red Sea down the coast of East Africa to the
Cape of Good Hope. This was done by withdrawing the fleet to Bombay (mod-
ern Mumbai) and Mombasa, which seemed advisable not least as the main Japa-
nese fleet, without a base in Ceylon, was forced to rely on distant Singapore.
Nevertheless, there was acute concern about the security of Ceylon, even of the
whole of India. The navy was no longer in a posture of forward defense and, cru-
cially, was unable to prevent an invasion. As there was no effective air cover to
protect India, the situation appeared more dire than that facing Britain in 1940
when threatened by German invasion.
In response, the British were encouraged to press forward their plan to seize
Madagascar from Vichy French forces. In March, intercepts had indicated that
Germany was urging Japan to occupy the island, and the British feared the bas-
ing of Japanese submarines there. On 5 May, the main port of Diégo Suarez was
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attacked; its defenders surrendered on 7 May, although additional operations
from September were necessary to achieve the island’s final surrender on 5 No-
vember. This was Britain’s first major amphibious success of the war.
The fate of Madagascar was indicative of that of Ceylon, as air superiority
supplied by two carriers was important to British success at Diégo Suarez, the
British being faced by no significant airpower on the part of Vichy, and cer-
tainly by no carrier. The crisis ended with most of the Japanese warships’ being
deployed for the attack on Port Moresby planned for early May, the attack that
was to lead to the battle of the Coral Sea.
The Japanese raid into the Indian Ocean is not only one of the great
counterfactuals (what-ifs) of the war but also a key indication of the impor-
tance of Midway. There was a greater vulnerability in the Indian Ocean than
that of the United States in the far larger Pacific. Instead, however, of pursu-
ing their potent advantage against the secondary enemy and possibly pre-
empting the invasion of Madagascar and crippling British oil movements,
the Japanese sent their carriers into the Pacific theater against their strongest
opponent. Of course, had the Japanese concentrated on the Pacific theater
throughout and not launched the raid into the Indian Ocean at all, they
might have been in a better position to exploit their initial advantage in the
Pacific, not least by putting pressure on the remainder of the American Pa-
cific Fleet.
As it was, four of the carriers Nagumo had taken into the Indian Ocean
were destroyed at Midway. This defeat led the Japanese to postpone their
plans to advance in the southwest Pacific, toward New Caledonia, Fiji, and
Samoa. Losses at Midway also reduced Japanese strategic options for future
campaigns in the Indian Ocean, while also making it less dangerous for the
Americans to prepare to mount attacks in the Pacific, which in turn further
reduced Japanese options in the Indian Ocean.
After Midway, the Japanese still had a large navy that was particularly
strong in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. Yet their losses in 1942 cost the
Japanese their lead in carrier strength, and by the spring of 1943 only one
fleet carrier (as against light carriers) was prepared for conflict. The others
were damaged. Three more fleet carriers were due for completion that year,
but the Americans were planning or building far more. There was also a ma-
jor disparity as far as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines were concerned.
The marked difference in industrial capability and effective war mobiliza-
tion of the two powers was readily apparent, and this difference was to be ac-
centuated by naval action. Whereas the Japanese navy could not strike at the
American economy, the inroads of American submarines greatly affected the
movement of raw materials to Japan and, therefore, its industrial capability.
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The contrast between the two economies was also seen in the construction of
merchant shipping, in which the Americans opened up a massive lead.
As a result, they could attack with greater safety. Off the island of
Guadalcanal in the southwest Pacific, from August 1942 to February 1943,
there was a struggle for the naval dominance correctly seen as crucial to the
struggle there on shore. In the battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on 26 October
1942, a strong Japanese fleet, including four carriers, attacked an American
fleet containing only two carriers, and the Americans lost one of them. How-
ever, the heavier loss of Japanese aircraft and, even more important, aircrew
was a major blow. From mid-November, however, the Americans were success-
ful in defeating the Japanese off Guadalcanal.
Thanks to Midway, and the war in the Pacific generally, the British were
obliged to deploy only limited naval strength against Japan until the closing year
of the war. The total Japanese concentration on the Pacific from May 1942 en-
sured that there were no more raids into the Indian Ocean, and no British war-
ship was lost there in 1943. Instead, the British fleet focused on the
Mediterranean and the Atlantic, notably in supporting the invasion of Italy in
1943. Whereas the British had had two carriers to cover the attack on Madagas-
car in May 1942, from January 1943 there were none in the Indian Ocean until
October, when an escort carrier arrived. In turn, after D-Day, Britain was able to
transfer much of its navy to take part in the war with Japan.
This contribution looked toward Britain’s subsequent naval cooperation
with the United States, both in NATO, which was to be created in 1949, and dur-
ing the Korean War (1950–53). The Indian Ocean remained a key area of British
naval activity and leadership until Britain’s withdrawal from “East of Suez” from
the late 1960s, but this presence was dependent on the extent to which alliance
with the United States covered British maritime interests in the Atlantic and the
Mediterranean. Similarly, the British naval position in the Indian Ocean helped
the Americans to focus on the Pacific.
Midway therefore can be understood as a crucial episode in the geopolitics of
the war and as a vital contribution to coalition politics and warfare. It was of a
part with the movement of American fighters to northern Australia from 17
March; the battle of the Coral Sea (7–8 May) helped strengthen the defense of
Australia, but in the meantime there had been plans to abandon the north and to
focus on defending a line north of Brisbane.
As Churchill was the first to note, American support for the continuation of
the British Empire was limited and conditional. Yet, even if indirect, it could be
crucial. Once the empire was gone and Britain’s position in South Asia changed
dramatically with Indian independence in 1947, it became difficult to think
back to the geopolitics of the situation, let alone to appreciate the value of India
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to Britain and others. The United States and the Soviet Union would probably
have defeated the Axis even had the situation in India and the Indian Ocean be-
come far worse, but Britain, understood as the British Empire, would have been
able to contribute far less. Moreover, the possible domino effect on the Pacific
War of a weakening of the Chinese position as a result of greater instability in In-
dia is worthy of contemplation. The Americans would have had to focus on air
attacks on Japan from the Pacific rather than, as originally, from China.
These points serve as a reminder of the degree to which strategy involves an
understanding of the relationships between different spheres of operation and
the associated prioritization of tasks and commitments. The Axis powers proved
deficient in such understanding compared to the Allies, although the latter faced
grave difficulties in trying to manage their responses to these relationships.
Counterfactualism, the what-ifs of history, has a bad academic press.13 Let me
therefore close with entries from the diary of General Sir Alan Brooke, the chief
of the Imperial General Staff, to remind us of the sense of threat felt at the high-
est level of British decision making. For 6 April 1942:
On reaching COS [the Chiefs of Staff Committee] I discovered that most of the Japa-
nese fleet appeared to be in the Indian Ocean and our Eastern Fleet retiring west-
ward. Up to present no signs of transports. I don’t like the situation much as we are
very weak in the Indian Ocean. I have been trying to get First Sea Lord to fix up with
the Americans some counter move toward Japan to cover this very predicament that
we are in, but he has failed to do so up to present.14
Brooke was even gloomier next day: “COS at which we looked into the un-
pleasant situation created by entrance of Japanese fleet into Indian Ocean. Just
what I had been afraid of and had been trying to get First Sea Lord busy about
during whole of last week. Also frantic calls for air support from Wavell, which
according to Portal there is little chance of meeting. I suppose this Empire has
never been in such a precarious position throughout its history!”
On 10 April, he added, “Usual COS meeting, mainly concerned in trying to
save India from the Japs. A gloomy prospect with loss of command of sea and
air.”15
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